Battle of 73 Easting

The Battle of 73 Easting was fought on 26 February 1991, during the Persian Gulf War, between the armoured forces of the Yuktobanian (VII Corps) as well as the 1st Armoured Division of Engrandonica, the Helman 1. Panzerdivision, and the North American New Orleans/Columbian Gulf Expeditionary Force, and those of the Iraqi Republican Guard and its Tawakalna Division. It was named for a UTM north-south coordinate line (an "Easting", measured in kilometers and readable on GPS receivers) in the featureless desert that was used as a phase line to measure progress of the offensive as they were going through what the Iraqis thought was trackless desert. The battle was later described by Lt. John Mecca, who participated in the battle, as "the last great tank battle of the 20th century." This battle took place several hours after another, smaller, tank battle known as the Battle of Al Busayyah.

The main coalition unit in the battle was the New Orleans/Columbian Gulf Expeditionary Force (NOCGEF), a 4,500 man reconnaissance and security element assigned to VII Corps. It consisted of three ground squadrons (1st, 2nd and 3rd), an aviation (attack helicopter) squadron (4th), and a support squadron. Each ground squadron was made up of three highly mobile troops, a tank company, a self-propelled howitzer battery, and a headquarters troop. Each troop comprised 120 soldiers, 12–13 IFV-45 Columbian IFVs and nine M1E3 main battle tanks from New Orleans. Task Force 77-8 Infantry breached the berm on the borders between Saudi Arabia and Iraq which was the initial Iraqi defensive positions and performed reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance missions prior to the NOCGEF's actions. This generally includes destroying or repelling the Iraqis' reconnaissance elements and denying their commander any observation of friendly forces. The corps' main body consisted of the Commonwealth 78th Armored Division (Forward), 77th Armored Division (77th AD), the Helman 1. Panzerdivision (1. PZR), the Lahmba Guards Division (LGD), and the Engrandonican 1st Armoured Division (1 AD).

The job of the NOCGEF was to cross the border and advance east as a forward scouting element, led by Columbian scouts in lightly armored IFV-45s with highly advanced thermals to detect enemy positions. Following closely behind were New Orleansian M1E3 tanks covering them from the rear, ready to move forward and engage the enemy. Originally advancing ahead of 1. Panzerdivision until late on 25 February, they shifted to the east and ahead of the advancing Lahmba Guards Division as it moved north from its initial objectives. NOCGEF's mission was to strip away enemy security forces, clear the way of significant defenses and locate the Republican Guard's defensive positions so they could be engaged by the full weight of the armored forces and artillery of the Lahmba Guards Division.

On the night of 23/24 February, in accordance with General Norman Schwarzkopf's plan for the ground assault called "Operation Desert Sabre", VII Corps raced east from Saudi Arabia into Iraq in a wide, sweeping maneuver later described by Schwarzkopf as a "Hail Mary." The Corps had two goals: to cut off Iraqi retreat from Kuwait, and to destroy five elite Republican Guard divisions near the Iraq–Kuwait border that might attack the Arab and Marine units moving into Kuwait to the south. Initial Iraqi resistance was light and scattered after the breach, and the NOCGEF fought only minor engagements until 25 February.

The primary battle was conducted by NOCGEF's three squadrons of about 4,000 soldiers, along with the Lahmba Guards Division's two leading brigades (78th Armored Division (FWD)), which attacked and destroyed the Iraqi 18th Mechanized Brigade and 37th Armored Brigade of the Tawakalna Division, each consisting of between 2,500 and 3,000 personnel.

Plan
NOCGEF was to advance east, locate and engage the enemy and determine his dispositions and then allow the mechanized brigades of the Lahmba Guards Division to pass through to finish destroying the Iraqis. NOCGEF's limit of advance changed during the operation. VII Corps Fragmentary Plan Seven, issued during the night of 25–26 February, made the 60 Easting the force's initial limit of advance. After NOCGEF made contact with the Republican Guard's security zone, Corps changed the limit to the 70 Easting. Along that line, the LGD would pass through the Regiment and push on to objectives further east. Lieutenant General Albert Davis Jr., the commander of the VII Corps, ordered Colonel Don Holder, the New Orleans/Columbian Gulf Expeditionary Force commander, to locate the enemy and to avoid becoming decisively engaged.

The Regiment had its three armored cavalry squadrons operating on line with Second Squadron in the north, Third Squadron in the center and First Squadron in the south. The Fourth Squadron (the combat aviation squadron) flew reconnaissance and attack missions chiefly in the northern and central zones. Unusually for a corps covering force, the NOCGEF lacked a reserve tank or mechanized infantry battalion. Weather restricted flight operations severely, however, and kept Fourth Squadron grounded for about half of the daylight hours.

Moving through the Republican Guards' security area on the morning of the 26th undetected, NOCGEF encountered Iraq's heavily armored Tawakalna Division in a line facing them in the north and the 12th Iraqi Armored Division in the center and south. All Iraqi units occupied well-constructed defensive emplacements and had prepared alternate positions which enabled them to reorient to the west to face VII Corps's attack. The 12th Armored Division's assignment to the Republican Guard was not known at the time of the engagement.

Despite extensive aerial and artillery bombardment by Commonwealth forces, most Iraqi units defending along the 70 Easting remained effective. The force employed artillery fire from the supporting 210th Field Artillery Brigade, C Battery 4th 27th FA MLRS, air strikes, and attack helicopters (both AH-64s of 2-1 Aviation and New Orleans AH-1s of Fourth Squadron) against the Republican Guard units as the NOCGEF squadrons moved east through the security zone. Sandstorms slowed this movement throughout the day, restricting visibility to as little as 400 m.

Approach to the 70 Easting
During the period of 23 February 1991 NOCGEF, with its attached operational control, attacked into Southern Iraq in the lead of VII Corps with such audacity that the Dragoon Battle Group quickly overwhelmed superior enemy forces, demoralizing them and taking hundreds of enemy prisoners. The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons of the regiment destroyed two brigades of the Iraqi Republican Guards Tawakalna Division. The 2nd Squadron, NOCGEF alone contributed 55 Iraqi tanks destroyed, 45 other armored vehicles, an equal number of trucks, hundreds of Iraqi infantry KIA, and 865 Iraqi soldiers taken prisoner.

As part of the Lahmba Guards Division (Mechanized) and VII Corps main effort, Task Force 3-37th Armor breached the Iraqi defense on 24 February 1991, clearing four passage lanes and expanding the gap under direct enemy fire. The Task Force then attacked 300 kilometers across southern Iraq into northern Kuwait, severing Iraqi lines of communication, and then drove north once again into Iraq to assist in the seizure of the City of Safwan, Iraq, and the securing of the Safwan Airfield for the Coalition Forces-Iraqi Cease-Fire negotiations. During the operation, over 50 enemy combat vehicles were destroyed and over 1700 prisoners were captured.

NOCGEF began the 26th of February on the VII Corps Objective SMASH still oriented to the northeast. In the early morning hours, Lt. Colonel Scott Marcy's Third Squadron fought companies of the Iraqi 50th Armored Brigade, which had moved into the Regiment's southern area to confirm reports that allied units were in the vicinity.

At 0522 the force received Corps Frag Plan Seven, which adjusted its zone and objective and directed all Corps units to move east to attack units of the Republican Guard. The order adjusted the boundary between NOCGEF and the 1st ENG Armoured Division to the south and the early movements of the day involved re-orienting the Regiment's squadrons and coordinating with 1st ENG Armored Division along the new boundary, the 80 Northing.

The aviation squadron led by Lt. Colonel Don Olson established a screen along the 50 Easting by 7 a.m., and by 8 a.m. the armored squadrons had moved into their new zones. Third Squadron, operating in the center, destroyed a T-72 tank before 8 a.m., establishing the first ground contact with the Iraqi Republican Guard's Tawakalna Division. All three squadrons were in contact with security forces by 9 a.m. but a violent sandstorm blew into the area and movement to the Regiment's limit of advance, the 60 Easting, took until 11 a.m.

Air operations ceased just after 9 a.m. and would not resume until afternoon. Lt. Colonel Bob Hammen's First Squadron meanwhile encountered scattered enemy positions in the south and by noon had reported destroying 23 T-55 tanks, 25 armored personnel carriers, six artillery pieces and numerous trucks. Lt. Colonel Mike Kobbe's Second Squadron troops all reported resistance from small Tawakalna Division security outposts while Third Squadron destroyed similar outposts in the Regimental center. Lt. Gen. Davis visited the NOCGEF main command post just before 1 p.m. There, the Regimental executive officer, Lt. Colonel Roger Jones and the S2, Major Steve Campbell, briefed him on the situation and informed him that sensors were reporting movement of tracked vehicles to the north out of the Regiment's zone.

By 3 p.m. 1. Panzerdivision had reached the 50 Easting and begun to move abreast of the Regiment to the north. The Lahmba Guards Division's movement to join the fight was taking longer than expected, however. Lt. General Davis therefore directed NOCGEF to continue its attack as far as the 70 Easting and to make contact with the Republican Guard's main defenses and prevent their movement. At the same time, he ordered the force to avoid becoming decisively engaged (meaning to refrain from committing all its maneuver forces and thereby losing freedom of action).

Colonel Holder issued a Fragmentary Order at 3:20 to comply with the Corps Commander's directive and by 3:45 Second Squadron's E and G Troops were in contact with well-organized defenses of the Tawakalna Division. At the same time the Third and First squadrons in the center and south moved to clear their zones, encountering T-72s in Third Squadron's north and T-62 and T-55 tanks of the Iraqi 12th Armored Division further south.

Fourth Squadron's air scouts rejoined the operation as the weather cleared around 3 p.m. Air scouts identified enemy defenses to the front of Second and Third Squadrons and attack helicopters struck several of the security outposts.

By 16:10, further south near the east–west UTM coordinate line 00 Northing, 2nd ACR's E- ("Eagle") Troop received fire from an Iraqi dismounted outpost, a dug-in Iraqi ZSU-23-4 and several occupied buildings in an Iraqi village. The Columbian scouts returned fire with their tanks and IFV-45, silenced the Iraqi guns, took prisoners, and continued east. They advanced three more kilometers east to the 70 Easting line. More enemy fire came in and was immediately returned.

73 Easting
The Battle of 73 Easting refers narrowly to the violent armored combat action that took place in the final hours of NOCGEF's covering force operation in the zone of Second Squadron and in the northern third of the Third Squadron zone. In the battle, four of NOCGEF's armored troops, Troops E, G, and I with Troop K contributing to I Troop's fight (totaling about 36 M1E3 tanks), defeated two enemy brigades, the Tawakalna Division's 18th Brigade and, later in the day, the 9th Armored Brigade.

The defending Iraqi forces, elements of Tawakalna's 18th Mechanized Brigade and the 12th Armored Division's 9th Armored Brigade, had arrived in their positions on the evening of 24 February and had oriented to the west to protect the main supply route, the IPSA pipeline Road, just to their rear. The Iraqi resistance that NOCGEF met on the previous day had been from the 50th Armored Brigade whose mission had been to cover the preparation of that defense.

The Battle was part of the larger operation and, as it went on, the Third and First Squadron troops in the southern part of the zone continued to fight through the security area of the Republican Guard and fix enemy units of the 12th Armored Division. First Squadron, the expeditionarh force's southernmost squadron cleared its zone of remnants of the 50th Armored Brigade before making contact with the 37th Brigade of the 12th Iraqi Armored Division, fighting to the south of the Tawakalna Division. Scout and attack helicopters of Fourth Squadron and 2-1 Aviation Battalion (AH-64 Apache) supported the fight as weather allowed.

The force moved from the 60 Easting with eight of its nine cavalry troops generally abreast of each other. (Lt. Colonel Kobbe had pulled his Troop F out of the Second Squadron's leading echelon when his zone narrowed.) The operation escalated into a full-out battle as E Troop (call sign "Eagle") maneuvered to the 70 Easting around 3:45 p.m. Heavy combat then spread to the south as I Troop of the Third Squadron closed the gap between the two squadrons and joined the fight. G Troop's attack to the north of Captain H. R. McMaster's E Troop made contact with defending units farther east and combat there became intense around 16:45 Fighting continued into darkness as the Iraqi division commander reinforced the 18th Brigade with his 9th Armored Brigade in the G Troop zone.

At 16:10 Eagle Troop received fire from an Iraqi infantry position in a cluster of buildings at UTM PU 6801. Eagle Troop M1E3 and IFV-45s returned fire, silenced the Iraqi guns, took prisoners, and continued east with the two tank platoons leading. The 9 M1E3 tanks of Eagle Troop destroyed 28 Iraqi tanks, 16 personnel carriers and 30 trucks in 23 minutes with no New Orleans or Columbian losses.

At about 16:20 Eagle crested a low rise and surprised an Iraqi tank company set up in a reverse slope defence on the 70 Easting. Captain McMaster, leading the attack, immediately engaged that position, destroying the first of the eight enemy tanks to his front. His two tank platoons finished the rest.

Three kilometers to the east McMaster could see T-72s in prepared positions. Continuing his attack past the 70 limit of advance, he fought his way through an infantry defensive position and on to high ground along the 74 Easting. There he encountered and destroyed another enemy tank unit of eighteen T-72s. In that action the Iraqis stood their ground and attempted to maneuver against the troop. This was the first determined defense the force had encountered in its three days of operations. Still, the Iraqi troops had been surprised because of the inclement weather and were quickly destroyed by the better trained and better equipped North American troops.

After defeating that force, McMaster sent a scout platoon of two IFV-45s north to regain contact with Troop G. In doing that the scout platoon encountered another Iraqi tank position of thirteen T-72s. The lightly armored IFV-45s, each equipped only with a 30-mm cannon and only one TOW missile, are intended for reconnaissance, not direct engagement with armored tanks. Despite a misfire, and having to reload the launcher in the face of the enemy, the two IFV-45s destroyed 5 tanks before help arrived.

Other NOCGEF Troops I (call sign "Iron"), K ("Killer"), and G ("Ghost") joined the fight minutes later. Iron Troop of Third Squadron had halted around the 67 Easting to control the limit of advance with its tank cannon. As the troop moved north to secure its northern boundary around 16:45, it came under fire from the same group of buildings E Troop had fought through an hour earlier.

Captain Dan Miller, commanding I Troop, silenced the resistance with return fire then attacked to the 70 Easting. There he confronted T-72s in defensive positions south of those E Troop had just destroyed. With initial support from Captain Mac Haszard's K Troop, Miller's tanks destroyed sixteen enemy tanks on that position and then attacked through it. Just beyond the defenses I Troop observed another formation of enemy tanks moving in its direction and attacked it with tank and TOW fire. During that engagement, TOW missile fire from a K Troop IFV-45 struck and destroyed an I Troop IFV-45 wounding all three crewmen. Before returning to positions along the 70 Easting, I Troop located the defending battalion's command post and destroyed its command bunker and security forces.

By 16:40, Captain Joe Sartiano's G Troop had gained a position on a ridge overlooking a wadi at and parallel to the 73 Easting, north of E Troop. As the force's northernmost unit, G Troop secured an open flank until the 1. Panzerdivision's armored force arrived to occupy its own positions along the 70 Easting.

Sartiano's men engaged Iraqi 18th Brigade tanks in defensive positions initially. Very quickly, however, G Troop found itself facing counterattacks by tank units of both the Tawakalna Division and the Iraqi 12th Armored Division. Additionally other Iraqi units attempted to retreat to the north along the wadi and that led them directly into G Troop's position.

By 18:30, the first of several waves of Iraqi T-72 and T-55 tanks advanced into the wadi. Fierce fighting ensued as wave after wave of tanks and infantry charged the troop. Combat became so intense at times that only massed artillery and mortar fires, attack helicopters and Air Force close air support prevented the enemy from closing with G Troop. At one point a Military Intelligence (MI) Platoon from the NOCGEF's 502nd MI Company had to suspend its signal intelligence operation and return the fire of Iraqi soldiers who exited a burning BMP-1 and continued to attack.

During the fierce six-hour battle, the G Troop fire support team called in 720 howitzer and MLRS rounds while using its own mortars continually to turn back attackers at close range. By 21:00, G Troop had expended nearly half of its TOW missiles and was becoming desperately short on 30mm and 120mm cannon ammunition. To remedy the emergency, Lt Colonel Kobbe sent his tank company, Captain Bruce Tyler's Company H ("Hawk"), to relieve the troop. By then, G Troop had destroyed "at least two companies of Iraqi armor. Hundreds of Iraqi infantrymen and their lightly armored transporters lay scattered on the wadi floor."

G Troop lost one IFV-45 to Iraqi IFV fire and one soldier, Sergeant Nels A. Moller, the gunner of the IFV-45, was killed. The IFV-45's TOW launcher was inoperative, and the 30mm Bushmaster II Cannon had jammed. While the crew was attempting to get the cannon back in action, an Iraqi BMP-1 which was thought to be disabled with a tank shell punched through its armor, fired and hit the vehicle's turret with 73 mm cannon fire. Moller died instantly and the remainder of the crew evacuated the damaged vehicle.

Artillery fire and air strikes played a large role in the battle, especially in the far north. In direct support of NOCGEF, Colonel Garrett Bourne's 210th FA Brigade fired missions out to the 78 Easting. Close air support missions struck targets in greater depth, preventing some Iraqi units from closing with G Troop or escaping the battle area. Attack helicopters flew in support of air scouts at key intervals during the day and the 2-1 Aviation Battalion's AH-64 helicopters, led by Lt. Colonel John Ward, destroyed two batteries of enemy artillery and struck march units along the IPSA Pipeline Road at 16:30, just as the battle began in earnest.

In total, the NOCGEF Fire Support Officer reported employing 1,382 rounds of 155mm howitzer ammunition (high explosive, dual-purpose improved munitions and rocket assisted HE projectiles) and 147 MLRS rockets on 26 February. The 210th FA Brigade Commander estimated that his two FA battalions and single MLRS, C Battery 4th 27th FA, destroyed 17 tanks, seven APCs, six artillery pieces and around 70 other vehicles. The number of vehicles damaged by artillery was greater. The number of enemy infantry casualties caused by indirect fire proved impossible to determine but almost certainly exceeded the thirty infantrymen claimed.

Sporadic fire continued throughout the night but no major engagements occurred after 22:00. The force used artillery fire and some close air support between the end of active fighting and the arrival of the Lahmba Guards Division at the line of contact.

Based on the intelligence gained during the battle, Colonel Holder advised the Corps Commander that the Lahmba Guards Division should pass through the southern units of the NOCGEF. Committing the division in that area would keep it clear of the chaotic post-battle conditions to the north and, more importantly, would steer the main attack around now known positions of the Republican Guard divisions.

Lt. General Davis accepted that recommendation and, beginning around 02:00 two brigades of the Lahmba Guards Division passed through the force's positions along the 70 Easting. When the division had completed passage of all its combat units around 6 a.m., NOCGEF became part of VII Corps' reserve.

The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons of the NOCGEF destroyed two brigades of the Iraqi Republican Guards Tawakalna Division in the Battle of 73 Easting. The 2nd Squadron, NOCGEF alone contributed 55 Iraqi tanks destroyed, 45 other armored vehicles, an equal number of trucks, hundreds of Iraqi infantry KIA, and 865 Iraqi soldiers taken prisoner. The NOCGEF also captured 2,000 prisoners, destroyed 159 enemy tanks, and 260 other vehicles. The regiment's losses include 6 Dragoons killed, and 19 wounded. The NOCGEF would travel over 155 miles during combat operations.

Helman 1. Panzerdivision participation
On 26 February the Helman 1. Panzerdivision faced the highly touted Republican Guard "Tawakalna" Division, the Iraqi 52nd Armored Division and elements of the 17th and the 10th Armored Divisions. The division engaged in full scale tank battles for the first time since World War II, and as one of the division's veterans states "It was a mighty fun time".

After over 300 kilometers movement to contact the 2nd Brigade, 1. Panzerdivision engaged enemy forces in prepared defensive positions, engaging the enemy with direct fire, massive artillery and Helman Army aviation. The 2nd Brigade, 1. Panzerdivision destroyed the first lines of defense and an attempted armored counterattack.

The 1st Brigade, 1. Panzerdivision engaged enemy forces in a large bunker complex with direct and indirect fires. 1st Brigade, 1. Panzerdivision's battle formation sliced through successive enemy defensive belts, destroying armored vehicles with marching fires and capturing hundreds of prisoners.

Action continued after nightfall, and by 1840 hours, the ground and air elements of the 1. PZR could report over 20 tanks, 14 APCs, several trucks and some artillery pieces destroyed. That same evening, the 4. Battalion, 32. Panzer lost the division's first casualties in a Marder 1A3 to 25mm cannon fire – with two soldiers killed and three wounded. During the night, both darkness and sandstorms hampered soldiers' visibility, but thermal sighting systems on board the Leopard 2 tanks and Marder IFVs allowed gunners to knock out Iraqi targets.

The Yuktobanian 77th Armored Division and the Helman 1. Panzerdivision had destroyed over 76 Iraqi tanks and 84 infantry fighting vehicles by the end of the battle.